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questions that criminal deterrence scholars have ignored either completely or to a large extent. These questions range
from fundamental (the distributional analysis of the criminal
justice system) to those hidden in plain sight (economic
analysis of misdemeanors), to those that are well-known yet
mostly overlooked (the role of positive incentives, offender’s
mental state, and celerity of punishment). Second, I use
“missing” to refer to the areas where substantial relevant
knowledge exists but is largely disregarded within the criminal deterrence research program. The empirical analysis of
environmental and tax compliance is a stark example. Finally,
I stretch “missing” to describe topics that have been both
studied and reviewed but where substantial challenges remain. These include the theoretical explanation for the role
of offense history, the proper accounting for the offender’s
gains, the estimation of the costs of various crimes, and the
cost-beneﬁt analysis of crime-reduction policies.
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Criminal Deterrence

Among the literature’s missing pieces, several stand out both
on their own and because they combine to produce a highly
unfortunate result. First, although the empirical side of the
literature focuses almost exclusively on street crime, the literature makes only a minor effort to estimate the cost of
crime and essentially no effort to estimate the cost of whitecollar offenses. This adds to the impression—not supported
by the available evidence—that street crime is a great social
problem while white-collar crime is a minor one. Second, the
literature fails to treat misdemeanors and misdemeanor
enforcement as an independent subject of study. This failure
contributes to the notion—also unjustiﬁed—that 13 million
or so misdemeanor charges a year and countless millions of
stops, frisks, and interrogations that lead to no charges—all
heavily skewed by race and class—are also not a major social problem. Third, the literature is only starting to develop
a beneﬁt-cost analysis of various crime-reducing strategies.
The analysis considers almost exclusively measures reﬂected
in the optimal deterrence model. This creates an impression—
almost surely false—that deterrence is the only means of reducing future crime. Finally, the literature ignores distributional analysis altogether, even though the burdens of crime
and the criminal justice system vary dramatically, predictably, and disturbingly by race and income. By disregarding
this variation, the literature may be reinforcing it. For all
these reasons, the criminal deterrence literature may well be
contributing to the overwhelming, singular focus of American
society and law enforcement on the forceful deterrence of
street crime. Addressing the missing pieces would enrich the
literature, expand its appeal and policy relevance, and enable academics to contribute to the effort of setting the US
criminal justice system on the path of long overdue structural
reforms.

1. INTRODUCTION
Criminal deterrence is a big subject: big in terms of its role in people’s lives, big in terms of the scope and scale of government expenditures, and big in terms of the academic attention it has captured
over decades.
Academic literature on criminal deterrence is vast, it is both theoretical and empirical, and it reﬂects a number of methodological
approaches including law, economics, and criminology. Excellent,
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comprehensive reviews of this literature are available, including recent ones (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017; Levitt and Miles 2007; Nagin
2013; Polinsky and Shavell 2007; Tonry 2008). Just 2 years ago, an
entire volume was published on the subject (Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson 2018). There is hardly a need for another similar review.
There is, however, a need to consider the questions that are largely
missing from these reviews and from the criminal deterrence literature overall. By “missing” I mean, ﬁrst, questions that criminal deterrence scholars have ignored either completely or to a large extent.
These questions range from fundamental (the distributional analysis
of the criminal justice system), to those hidden in plain sight (economic
analysis of misdemeanors), to those that are well-known yet mostly
overlooked (the role of positive incentives, offender’s mental state,
and celerity of punishment). Second, I use “missing” to refer to the
areas where substantial relevant knowledge exists but is largely disregarded within the criminal deterrence research program. The empirical
analysis of environmental and tax compliance is a stark example. Finally, I stretch “missing” to describe topics that have been both studied and reviewed but where substantial challenges remain. These include the theoretical explanation for the role of offense history, the
proper accounting for the offender’s gains, the estimation of the costs
of various crimes, and the cost-beneﬁt analysis of crime-reduction policies. Thus, the focus on the “missing” literature aims to offer a somewhat different perspective on the criminal deterrence research—a
perspective that expands the ﬁeld, emphasizes the need to tackle some
basic yet important questions, and highlights promising directions for
future work.
This review has four sections. The ﬁrst section asks what, if anything, is missing from the basic building blocks of the criminal deterrence research: its concepts and its facts. This inquiry is hardly at
the center of the literature. Yet the inquiry is important because it
reveals that the literature’s shortcomings vary from one criminal deterrence subﬁeld to the next. For instance, the economic theory of
crime is plausible when applied to white-collar offenses, but it encounters major problems when applied to violent crime. In contrast,
the empirical research of violent crime is vast while the econometric
analysis of white-collar offenses is essentially nonexistent. Whether
any of this is important depends on the social cost of violent crime
and white-collar offenses—the subject of both great signiﬁcance and
great uncertainty. The conceptual ground clearing undertaken in the
ﬁrst section sets up the discussion of these and many other distinctions later on.
The second section addresses the missing pieces in the theoretical
framework of criminal deterrence—the optimal deterrence theory. The
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third section deals with empirical questions and results. And the fourth
section addresses three open questions. The ﬁrst question—the role
of celerity of punishment—is known to be foundational but remains
unresolved. The second one—the economic analysis of misdemeanors—appears to be well studied but actually is not. And the third question—the distributional analysis of the criminal justice system—is decidedly fundamental but is missing from the literature entirely.
The conclusion emphasizes that among the literature’s missing
pieces, four stand out both on their own and because they combine
to produce a highly unfortunate result. First, although the empirical
side of the literature focuses almost exclusively on street crime, the
literature makes only a minor effort to estimate the cost of crime
and essentially no effort to estimate the cost of white-collar offenses.
This adds to the impression, which is not supported by the available
evidence, that street crime is a great social problem while white-collar
crime is a minor one. Second, the literature fails to treat misdemeanors and their enforcement as an independent subject of study. This
contributes to the notion, also unjustiﬁed, that 13 million misdemeanor
charges a year and countless millions of stops, frisks, and interrogations that lead to no charges—all heavily skewed by race and class—
are not a major social problem either. Third, the literature is only starting
to develop a beneﬁt-cost analysis of various crime-reducing strategies. The analysis considers almost exclusively measures reﬂected in
the optimal deterrence model. This creates an impression, almost certainly false, that deterrence is the only means of reducing future crime.
Finally, the literature ignores distributional analysis altogether, even
though the burdens of crime and the criminal justice system vary dramatically, predictably, and disturbingly by race and income. By disregarding this variation, the literature may be reinforcing it. For all
these reasons, the criminal deterrence literature may well be contributing to the overwhelming, singular focus of American society and
law enforcement on the forceful deterrence of street crime. At the
very least, the literature has not deployed its powerful tools to show
that this focus may be misguided for many reasons, economic and
otherwise.

2. KEY CONCEPTS AND DATA
2.1. What Does Criminal Deterrence Study?
A study of criminal deterrence is a study of crime. Yet the meaning
of “crime” is by no means clear. It varies from one subﬁeld of the
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criminal deterrence scholarship to the next. And it is not welldeﬁned within the various subﬁelds.
Starting with empirics, “crime” to an econometrician is what can
be measured. There are two main sources of crime data in the United
States. The ﬁrst source is the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) containing standardized, nationwide information about certain crimes. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) collects and compiles that information and publishes it annually in Crime in the United States (Addington 2019; Levitt and Miles 2007). The UCR tracks seven types of
crime included in the FBI’s “Index I” offenses. Three of these seven
are violent personal crimes: homicide, rape, and aggravated assault.
Three others are property crimes: burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. And the last one—robbery—is both a violent personal and a
property crime. The UCR also collects data on arson, but it is substantially less reliable because of many missing values (Levitt and
Miles 2007). The FBI has been trying to expand its information collection efforts to other types of crimes, and it has recently taken a
decisive step toward accomplishing this goal, as discussed later. But
for now, the comprehensive data available from the UCR are limited
to the seven index crimes.
The second main source of crime data is the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) that was known prior to 1990 as the National Crime Survey. The NCVS aggregates surveyed households’ selfreports of exposure to crime. The US Census Bureau conducts the
survey and publishes annual results. The NCVS tracks the same offense categories as does the UCR with the exception of homicide (there
are no victims to report the crime).
Clearly, the two major databases used by empirical economists
contain information about a very limited range of criminal behavior.
Some empirical analyses go beyond the UCR and NCVS data and investigate such offenses as drunk driving and drug possession (Cook
2012; Kuziemko and Levitt 2004). Some recent research takes advantage of more comprehensive and detailed data sets (Lee and McCrary
2017). But overall, “little empirical evidence exists on illegal activities that are essentially voluntary transactions, such as prostitution
or the purchase and consumption of controlled drugs, as well as on
crimes in which victims are unaware that they have been harmed,
such as insider trading or many frauds” (Levitt and Miles 2007, 458).
So to an empiricist, criminal deterrence is primarily a study of homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor
vehicle theft. Following the convention in the literature, I refer to this
list—and to “crime” as the term is used in empirical research—as “index crimes.”
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Important as index crimes are to an empirical economist, they
play no special role in theoretical analysis. Not only does deterrence
theory extend beyond index crimes, it extends beyond all crimes. The
optimal deterrence theory is also known as the theory of public enforcement of law for a reason. The theory’s basic model focuses on
the trade-off between the private gain and the external harm and on
the government’s ability to deter acts where the harm exceeds the
gain by imposing a cost on the putative offender. The external harm
need not be violent or personal or take any particular form. Assault
gives rise to an external harm, but so do pollution, tax evasion, auto
accidents, and defective products. Sanctions, too, are just a cost imposed on the offender and they may take any form.
The theory distinguishes between sanctions that are monetary
and nonmonetary. The main difference between the two is that the
magnitude of nonmonetary sanctions is not limited by the offender’s
wealth. Nonmonetary sanctions are typically referred to as “imprisonment,” though other forms of nonﬁnancial sanctions that can be
imposed on an offender unable to pay a large ﬁne surely exist (Polinsky and Shavell 2007). “Crime” is simply any offense that is punished by nonmonetary sanctions (Polinsky and Shavell 2007, 421;
Shavell 2004, 541–42).1 It has no special meaning in the optimal deterrence theory.2
Several decades ago, law and economics scholars tried to accomplish a more ambitious task of offering an efﬁciency-based explanation of criminal law as a distinct category of legal rules (Calabresi
and Melamed 1972; Klevorick 1985; Posner 1985; Shavell 1985). These
attempts have not fared well under the scrutiny of legal philosophers
(Coleman 2000) and have been generally abandoned.3 So today, the
1
Some models investigate crimes that are punished by ﬁnes, essentially eliminating the difference between criminal and civil violations (or at least those civil violations that are enforced by government agents rather than private plaintiffs).
2
Another important difference is that monetary sanctions are transferable (the
payor’s ﬁnancial loss is someone else’s ﬁnancial gain) while “imprisonment” is not.
Imprisonment is in quotes here because any nontransferable sanction (e.g., a suspension or a loss of a professional license) is equivalent to actual imprisonment in the
optimal deterrence framework. Notably, nontransferability of “imprisonment” is its
unfortunate side effect (because it wastes resources). In contrast, the opportunity to
use “imprisonment” to impose a cost in excess of the offender’s total wealth is the
key advantage of “imprisonment” from the optimal deterrence perspective.
3
Shavell’s more recent book discusses the reasons to treat some offenses as
crimes, but it largely restates his earlier points (Shavell 1985, 2004). Other scholars
pointed out various distinctions between torts and crimes, mostly limiting the latter
to index crimes (Boston University Law Review 1996; Friedman 2000; Mungan 2012).
Yet after a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying the economic rationale for
criminal law, Friedman (2000, 295) concludes that the “current sorting of offenses
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concept of crime in the optimal deterrence theory is purely derivative
of the type of sanction imposed. Importantly for our purposes, this
concept is surely broader than the seven index crimes generally studied by empirical economists.
And then, of course, there is the law. Here, one would think, crime
has a very precise and clear meaning: crime is whatever the law says it
is. Alas, “the law” is anything but clear. Most crimes are deﬁned by state
law. And states vary greatly not only in how they deﬁne speciﬁc crimes
(say, as a murder or an assault) but also in their deﬁnitions of crime as a
general category.
Wyoming offers a clear deﬁnition: “No conduct constitutes a crime
unless it is described as a crime in this act or in another statute of this
state” (Wyoming Criminal Code 6-1-102(a)). In Washington, a crime is
an offense punishable by imprisonment (Washington Criminal Code
§ 9A.04.040). In Wisconsin, a crime is “conduct which is prohibited by
state law and punishable by ﬁne or imprisonment or both” (2011–12
Wis. Stats. §939.12; emphasis added). And in the country’s most populous state, crimes are not deﬁned as a category at all. Instead, under
the California Penal Code, “a crime or a public offense [is a prohibited
act punishable by] 1. Death; 2. Imprisonment; 3. Fine; 4. Removal
from ofﬁce; or 5. Disqualiﬁcation to hold and enjoy any ofﬁce of honor,
trust, or proﬁt in this State” (California Penal Code § 15). Clearly, the
same act may be a crime in one state and not in another. As clearly,
the number of offenses deﬁned as crimes by state and federal laws—
both felonies and misdemeanors—is vastly greater than the seven offenses in the FBI crime index. “Crime” to an empirical economist
and a lawyer has very different meanings indeed.
The same is true for theorists and empiricists. Index crimes are
surely “crimes” for modeling purposes because their commission
leads to sanctions not limited by the offender’s wealth (i.e., imprisonment). But this is where the similarity ends. Many other violations of
public law ﬁt squarely in the optimal deterrence framework and may
lead to imprisonment but are not index crimes. Just think about securities fraud, price ﬁxing, tax evasion, and the like. Moreover, although
index crimes are all felonies, criminal misdemeanors can and do lead
to imprisonment as well (Natapoff 2019). So for a theorist, just as for a
lawyer, crime is a much broader concept than what empirical economists study.
Finally, not all violations of criminal law are punished by imprisonment (that is, not all are crimes in the optimal deterrence sense). At
the same time, some offenses that do lead to jail time are not criminal
between the categories of crime and tort has at most a modest relation to what that
analysis suggests would be an efﬁcient division.”
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as a matter of law (the notoriously vague “disorderly conduct” is the
prime example; Natapoff 2019).4 So the legal deﬁnition of crime is both
broader and narrower than the one in the optimal deterrence theory.
And, as already mentioned, the optimal deterrence theory also applies
to a vast array of harm-producing activities that are not criminal in
the legal sense. Thus, violations of public law modeled by deterrence
theory (including violations punishable by ﬁnes and “imprisonment”)
are the broadest category of offenses considered in the criminal deterrence literature.
These distinctions are not mere semantics. Their signiﬁcance is revealed throughout this review, but two examples would give a sense
of the problem. Say a theorist working on the economic analysis of
crime makes a prediction of how individuals would respond if sanctions are adjusted in a particular way. The prediction is tested empirically, and the data do not support it. Is this because the prediction
is wrong or because a very particular set of offenses—index crimes—
poorly ﬁt the theory (while other crimes in a legal sense would ﬁt it
perfectly well)? Similarly, if our deep moral intuitions raise difﬁcult
questions when the economic model of criminal behavior is applied
to homicide, rape, and aggravated assault—the three personal index
crimes—does this mean that the model is not apt for the analysis of
all violations of state and federal criminal laws?
The misalignment in the empirical, theoretical, and legal meanings of crime leads to more than occasional confusion. At the most
basic level, the subject of the criminal deterrence research is poorly
deﬁned. It varies by context, and this variation complicates the empirical analysis of theoretical conclusions and the application of both
to policy making. Yet the discussion of the uncertain meaning of
crime and the resulting complications is largely missing from the
criminal deterrence literature.
2.2. What Is the Cost of Crime?
Few would argue that crime is not a serious social problem in the
United States. But how serious is it? In economic parlance, what is
the cost of crime? The answer to this simple question turns out to
be remarkably unclear.
In 2017, after consulting with the National Academies of Sciences, the US Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) issued a report to Congress summarizing the best available evidence on the
cost of crime in the United States. “Researchers have estimated
4
States differ in their classiﬁcation of disorderly conduct as a criminal or civil violation (Stevenson and Mayson 2018, 739).
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varying annual costs of crime, including totals of $690 billion,
$1.57 trillion, and $3.41 trillion,” GAO concluded (GAO 2017, 1). How
could the estimates vary so much? “GAO found that there is no commonly used approach for estimating the costs of crime, and experts
face multiple challenges when making estimates. GAO identiﬁed four
primary methods to estimate costs, each with limitations: (1) measuring effects on markets, (2) using jury awards, (3) surveying the public
for its willingness to pay to reduce crime, and (4) calculating individual
categories of cost to develop a total cost” (GAO 2017, highlights). All
of these methodologies, the experts told GAO, are inadequate. Crime
is a big problem, but it is not clear how big it is.
The uncertainty about the cost of crime is not troubling if the
question is whether social scientists should study it. All estimates
suggest that the cost of crime is high, surely high enough to merit researchers’ attention. But the same uncertainty is indeed an issue if the
question is where the researchers should focus their studies, that is,
which speciﬁc crimes or types of crimes are most costly and important to analyze, understand, and deter.
A search for an answer to this question encounters two major obstacles. First, the cost-of-crime estimates ignore misdemeanors, the
most common crimes committed in the United States. Every year,
3–4 million felony cases are ﬁled nationally. In contrast, courts handle approximately 13 million new misdemeanor cases annually (Stevenson and Mayson 2018). These estimates are rough. The UCR does
not track felonies and misdemeanors separately, and there is no deﬁnition of a misdemeanor that reﬂects the varying criminal laws of different states. Mayson and Stevenson (2020) take a close look at subfelony cases in eight diverse US counties and conclude that “courts,
policymakers, and scholars should take care not to generalize about
‘misdemeanors’ on the false assumption that the term describes a coherent set of universally criminalized behaviors” (Mayson and Stevenson 2020, 982–83). Still, there is no doubt that misdemeanors
are a major part of the US criminal justice system, at least in terms
of raw numbers.
Felonies and misdemeanors give rise to very different costs. The
main costs of felonies are borne by the victims. The main—or at least
signiﬁcant—costs of misdemeanors are borne by the accused who are
overwhelmingly poor and nonwhite (Mayson and Stevenson 2020).
These costs are far from trivial. A misdemeanor conviction or even
a charge may land the accused in jail for days, cause the accused the
loss of a job, child custody, nutritional assistance, or eligibility for student loans and may lead to deportation. A criminal record resulting
from a misdemeanor conviction can add years of prison time to a sentence for a subsequent offense (Natapoff 2012). The existence of these
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costs and their social signiﬁcance are beyond doubt. Yet there appear
to have been no efforts to estimate them and compare them to the
costs of felonies.
The second major obstacle to evaluating the cost of crime is that
another vast area of criminal law has largely escaped the gaze of
criminal deterrence scholars. We know exceedingly little about the
cost of white-collar crime.
There is no accepted deﬁnition of the term “white-collar crime,”
and its use in the literature varies signiﬁcantly. Two deﬁnitions are
illustrative. The ﬁrst one is focused on the nature of the offense.
White-collar offense is deﬁned as “an illegal act or a series of illegal
acts committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile
to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money
or property, or to obtain personal or business advantage” (Edelhertz
1970, 3). The second deﬁnition is based on the role of the offender:
“White-collar offenses are any violations of law committed by persons or organizations in the conduct of their legitimate occupational
roles or organizational functions” (Simpson and Yeager 2015, 47).
Several features of these two deﬁnitions are worth emphasizing.
First, although the familiar term is “white-collar crime,” neither definition is limited to criminal acts. This makes perfect sense. In some
settings, the only difference between a civil and a criminal violation
is the burden of proof (Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, 473 U.S.
479, 491 [1985]; Saltzman and Book 2020, 12.06[5]). In most settings,
the difference between a civil and criminal charge is a matter of prosecutorial discretion reﬂecting practical considerations like resource
availability and the prosecutor’s preferences (Simpson and Yeager
2015). Moreover, because the offenses in questions do not involve violence, it is difﬁcult to justify a sharp line between acts that produce
similar harms in a similar fashion. This is especially true because
the law often draws this line based on a single number, be it dollars
involved or the quantity of pollutant emitted. For all these reasons,
the rest of this review refers to white-collar offenses rather than crimes.
As should be clear by now, erasing the sharp distinction between
criminal and civil white-collar offenses is entirely consistent with the
optimal deterrence theory. Erasing this difference also accentuates
the gap between index crimes studied in most of the empirical literature and crime as the phenomenon that society and the criminal deterrence scholarship need to understand and address.
Another point worth noting is that some white-collar offenses under both deﬁnitions quoted earlier give rise to tangible harms, such
as the damage to the environment or to the health and safety of individuals. Such damage is typically one of the largest components of
the overall social cost of these violations. But many white-collar
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offenses are ﬁnancial transfers from the victim (or victims) to the offender. For these, the amount of the transfer and the resulting social
cost may differ sharply.
Finally, the ﬁrst deﬁnition of white-collar offense—but not the
second one—includes personal fraud ranging from tax fraud to welfare fraud, counterfeiting, forgery, telemarketing fraud, credit card
fraud, cyber fraud, and the like. The literature has not arrived at a consensus about whether personal fraud should be viewed as a whitecollar offense. Adding to the confusion, some sources treat regulatory
offenses as a separate category (GAO 2017, 24; Miller et al. 1996, 6)
while others view them as central to the concept of white-collar offenses (Simpson and Yeager 2015).
With limited exceptions, information about white-collar offenses
is not collected by any federal agency. No white-collar offense is included in index crimes. Empirical economists do not study these offenses, and their costs are largely unknown (GAO 2017; Miller et al.
1996; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
2016). As a result, and with the exception of an occasional ﬁnancial
scandal, white-collar offenses fail to capture the attention of the public and the lawmakers. As the National Academies of Sciences reported to the GAO, the prevalence of the information about street
crimes in the nationally maintained databases “has limited the public’s perception of what constitutes a crime” (GAO 2017, 15). When
the government’s report called “Crime in the United States” ignores
all white-collar offenses, it is easy to conclude that these offenses are
only a minor social problem (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, 25).
Yet whether the omission of white-collar offenses from the costof-crime estimates is a trivial or a major deﬁciency depends on the relative costs of street crimes and white-collar offenses. What are these
relative costs? Although the data are scarce and not particularly reliable, some estimates do exist.
The most recent comprehensive cost-of-crime estimate cited by
GAO (2017) is found in Anderson (2011). He estimates the cost of
crime in the United States to equal $3,216 billion a year. Of that,
he attributes $1,561 billion to white-collar offenses.
The largest components of Anderson’s (2011) $1,561 billion estimate are as follows: $762 billion cost of occupational fraud, based
on the estimates of the Association of Certiﬁed Fraud Examiners;
$294 billion net tax gap based on the estimate by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (the more recent number is $381 billion [IRS 2019]);
$184 billion cost of health insurance fraud based on the estimates by
the FBI and the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association; and
$145 billion in retail fraud based on the estimate of Javelin Strategy
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& Research (Anderson 2011, 238–40). In contrast to these large numbers, the estimated annual cost of robbery—one of the seven index
crimes—is only $727 million (Anderson 2011, 249).
Anderson (2011, 227) also estimates the cost of cybercrime based
on the FBI’s assessment that computer-related crime cost businesses
$78.1 billion in 2006. More recent numbers are much higher. In 2019,
Accenture’s forecast for the cost of cybercrime was $1 billion a year
worldwide for the next 5 years (Accenture 2019, 14). Given that the
US economy represents about 20% of world gross domestic product
(World Bank 2020), Accenture’s estimate suggests the US cost of cybercrime is on the order of $200 billion a year. The FBI (2019) report
on internet crime states that the agency’s Internet Crime Complaint
Center (IC3) received complaints reporting losses exceeding $3.5 billion, more than half of which came from “business email compromise/email account compromise complaints” (fraudulent and unauthorized transfers of funds). This extremely high reported number may
well reﬂect net annual losses (after recoveries) of over $300 billion—
a total comparable to a rough estimate based on Accenture’s analysis.5
Barkan (2018) also collects cost estimates for various white-collar
offenses. The largest of these estimates are between $100 and $400 billion for insurance fraud and between $77 and $259 billion for healthcare fraud, both based on the data from the Insurance Information Institute. Barkan concludes that, conservatively estimated, the total cost of
white-collar offenses is $588 billion annually (Barkan 2018, 262). When
tax noncompliance is included, this number grows to $969 billion.
Note that although the tax gap is included in what Anderson
(2011, 254–55) interchangeably calls “white-collar crimes” and “transfers,” the vast majority of the revenue lost to tax noncompliance is
certainly not due to criminal activity.6 Given the earlier discussion,
treating tax noncompliance as a white-collar offense makes perfect
sense.7
Looking beyond the United States does not bring much clarity.
Czabanski (2009) reports that as of 2009, there was a single cost-of-crime

5
The FBI has been successful in recovering some internet losses. It reports a recovery rate of its Recovery Asset Team of 79% (FBI 2019), leaving 21% of $3.5 trillion or
$735 billion a year as not recoverable. Even if these losses are overreported by half, the
actual net losses exceed $300 billion.
6
Tax crimes amount to a small fraction of tax enforcement, and the tax gap estimates published by the IRS do not break down revenue losses for criminal and civil
violations separately.
7
Note that the tax gap number includes individual tax noncompliance, which
would be covered by the offense-centered but not by the role-centered deﬁnition, and
business-level noncompliance, which would be covered by both deﬁnitions.
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estimate outside of the English-speaking world—a short 1999 article focused on France. Wickramasekera et al. (2015) review 21 cost-of-crime
studies from six countries. The types of crimes included in various studies vary, as do the types of costs considered. Some of the studies estimate the cost of fraud, though none appear to evaluate white-collar
offenses more broadly. The authors conclude that, on average, fraud accounts for 17% of the total cost of crime. The standard deviation of this
estimate (13%) reveals the extent of variation, although the dispersion
of estimates for many other types of crimes is even greater (Wickramasekera et al. 2015, 225–26).
Among the cost estimates for white-collar offenses just discussed,
the US tax gap number is surely the most reliable one. So it is worth
comparing with the conservative estimate of the cost of index crime.
According to Chalﬁn (2016, 11), that cost for 2012 “is approximately
$200 billion if only Uniform Crime Reports index crimes reported to
the police are counted, and as high as $310 billion when unreported
crimes are accounted for.” Chalﬁn (2016, 11) notes that these estimates “do not credibly account for dynamic responses of individuals
to increases in crime nor are the costs of non-index crimes counted.”
Chalﬁn and McCrary (2018) offer a similar estimate, and when the
cost of police is included, the number rises to approximate $440 billion.8 These numbers are comparable to the $381 billion tax gap number. And tax noncompliance is just one white-collar offense out of
many.
Of course, tax noncompliance is a transfer (from the state to the
offenders) while index crimes lead to real social costs. Anderson’s
(2011) estimate of $3,216 billion a year for the total cost of crime reﬂects the cost of crime to the victims. Anderson (2011, 248) attributes
$1,516 billion of the total $3,216 billion to white-collar offenses and
excludes that amount from the social cost of crime because “transfers
of goods and money via fraud and theft do not necessarily impose a net
burden on society.” This is familiar point in economics. “Mere transfers” (Donohue 2009, 286), as they are often called in the literature,
are costly to the victims but not to the society as a whole given that
no value is destroyed as resources are moved around in the economy
(Shavell 1991). Yet the social cost of transfers is almost certainly
greater than this logic suggests.
Tullock (1967) pioneered the literature on rent-seeking when he
pointed out that the cost of tariffs, monopolies, and theft is greater than
the deadweight loss triangle because domestic producers, monopolists,
8
Chalﬁn and McCrary (2018) estimate the cost of index crime per capita as $995
and the per capita cost of police as $341. Given the US population of about 330 million, the total cost is about $440 billion.
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and thieves would deploy resources to secure their gains. “Transfers
themselves cost society nothing,” Tullock (1967, 230) explained,
“but for the people engaging in them they are just like any other activity, and this means that large resources may be invested in attempting
to make or prevent transfers. These largely offsetting commitments
of resources are totally wasted from the standpoint of society as a
whole.” To take one stark example, Americans are estimated to spend
$164 billion worth of time every year locking and unlocking doors
and (not to be omitted!) looking for misplaced keys (Anderson 2011,
247).
Those engaged in securities fraud, welfare fraud, price ﬁxing, and
the like expend resources to secure the intended gains while remaining undetected. On the other side, putative transferees invest resources to prevent these transfers. At the extreme, an embezzler
would invest up to a dollar to embezzle a dollar and a potential victim of embezzlement would invest up to a dollar to prevent it. So
contrary to Anderson’s (2011) remark, the social cost of transfers may
be as much as twice the amount transferred (Wenders 1987). These
are real social costs of white-collar offenses.
As this review makes clear, data on white-collar offenses are scarce,
and many of the estimates that do exist are speculative. So the point
here is certainly not to condemn the empirical criminal deterrence literature for missing a major part of the problem by focusing on index
crimes and ignoring white-collar offenses as well as misdemeanors.
Rather, the argument is that there is no reason to think that the cost
of white-collar offenses to the society is insigniﬁcant compared with
the crimes that the literature has been studying for decades. So it
is difﬁcult to justify the literature’s almost exclusive focus on index crimes and its disregard of white-collar offenses. Moreover, given
Anderson’s (2011, 254–55) estimate that most of the increase in the
total cost of crime between the mid-1990s and 2011 came from whitecollar offenses, the missing study of these offenses is even more problematic. In any case, the empirical analysis of white-collar offenses is a
pressing need.
There is little doubt that the reason for the literature’s inattention
to white-collar offenses is lack of reliable data. Fortunately, more
data on some forms of white-collar offenses are about to become accessible. And vastly more information on regulatory offenses is not
far out of reach.
The FBI has been running the UCR program since 1930. The UCRs
are based on crime reports from 18,000 city, county, university/college, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement agencies. The reporting
is voluntary, but the participation rate is very high. The reports cover
over 98% of the US population (GAO 2017).
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Until recently, the FBI relied on the Summary Reporting System
(SRS) to collect the information. Since 1991, however, the FBI started
collecting additional crime statistics using the National IncidentBased Reporting System (NIBRS). NIBRS covers many more offenses
in greater detail, but many fewer reporting units participate. As of
2017, for example, no major US city used NIBRS to report crime statistics (Addington 2019). After years of slow progress, the FBI announced in 2016 that starting in 2021, it will accept crime data only
using NIBRS, with the historic (and still widely used) SRS ﬁnally being discontinued.
Nationwide NIBRS reporting would contain some data that would
shed light on the cost of white-collar offenses. In 2014, the FBI added
cyberspace as a new crime location (FBI 2019). NIBRS offense categories include bribery, fraud (including wire fraud and welfare fraud),
cybercrime, and computer hacking.9 They also include embezzlement and general fraud, just as SRS reports do. Still, the vast majority of white-collar offenses remain outside of the NIBRS program.
Researchers would need to look elsewhere for that information.
Fortunately, there is a good place to start—a recent, detailed, and
comprehensive report by Simpson and Yeager (2015). At the request
of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, these scholars compiled an exhaustive list of data sources that are currently available—or may plausibly be made available—from many of the 44 federal agencies that
have enforcement responsibilities and information about whitecollar offenses. The authors focus on the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau. The authors also discuss data that are
or may be made available by the fraud and environmental crime
units of the Department of Justice, the Administrative Ofﬁce of the
US Courts, the Ofﬁce for Victims of Crime, and the Department of
Health and Human Services. The authors do not discuss the IRS,
but the tax agency has been collecting data on tax noncompliance
starting as far back as 1964 (Brown and Mazur 2003).10 Simpson and
Yeager (2015) clearly show that more and better data on white-collar
offenses are within reach.
This section’s focus on the issues of measurement and data discovery may seem excessive. Economists run regressions using data
9
Cybercrime includes “wrongfully obtaining and using another person’s personal
data like name, date of birth, Social Security number” and the like, and hacking includes “wrongfully gaining access to another person’s or institution’s computer software or networks” (GAO 2017, 24).
10
The most likely reason for this omission is that the only way to get access to the
administrative tax data is to participate in a special program run by the IRS (2018).

16

Criminal Deterrence

that are available. Cost estimates are not worth much if they are
highly speculative. So it seems self-evident that the best economists
can do is to take the available data and apply the econometric techniques to it. Although all of this is true, it may be illuminating to
consider another area of empirical research that has undergone a major shift in focus in the past 2 decades—a shift driven by the realization that data discovery is at least as important as data analysis.
Public economics has a long history of empirical research. Early
estimates of labor supply elasticities date back to the 1970s (Rosen
1976; Wales 1973). There are countless, increasingly sophisticated
tests of people’s responses to income taxes, capital gain taxes, payroll taxes, value-added taxes, cigarette taxes, and so on. Yet the research program that has dominated all these studies in terms of both
public inﬂuence and social importance has been focused on a much
more basic question: Who earns what and how has the distribution
of earnings changed over time?
The search for answers to these questions—questions that were
simply not asked until the early 2000s (Piketty and Saez 2003)—
has mushroomed into an entire subﬁeld of public economics. The
public attention is mostly drawn to the U-shaped tragectory of income
shares going to the highest earners over the past century. But for researchers, perhaps the most sobering lesson has been the difﬁculty
of answering even the most basic questions such as how incomes reported to the government on tax returns change over time (Auten and
Splinter 2019; Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 2018) and whether the income of highest earners is derived mostly from labor or capital (Piketty,
Saez, and Zucman 2018; Smith et al. 2019). Yet answering these questions has turned out to be much more important than making incremental reﬁnements in estimating various elasticities.
If nothing else, this comparison should motivate empirical criminologists and economists. New research on the cost of crime—with
crime being broadly understood to include all white-collar offenses
as well as misdemeanors—may turn out to be the most important,
consequential, policy-relevant, and exciting area of criminal deterrence research in the coming decades.

3. THE MISSING PIECES OF THE OPTIMAL
DETERRENCE PUZZLE
Turning from measurements to models, this section address the theory of optimal deterrence. The goal is to consider whether several
key propositions of that theory still contain “missing” pieces, in a
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sense that some basic questions about these propositions remain
unsettled.11
3.1. What to Do with Offenders’ Gains?
The foundational proposition of the optimal deterrence theory is that
the government should deter private acts producing external harms in
excess of private gains while allowing private acts for which the gains
exceed the harms. This point was made by the theory’s progenitors,
Jeremy Bentham ([1823] 2010) and Cesare Beccaria ([1767] 1995). And
it was embraced by Becker when he formalized this trade-off in his
seminal article (Becker 1968). Yet Becker’s view of the government’s
optimization problem was immediately challenged by Stigler (1970).
The two Nobel laureates disagreed about whose gains ought to count.
Becker’s answer was “everyone’s.” Stigler’s view was “certainly not!”
“What evidence is there that society sets a positive value upon the utility derived from a murder, rape, or arson?”, Stigler asked incredulously.
The “society has branded the utility derived from such activities as
illicit” he added (527) without offering any evidence that society recognizes as much as the concept of utility, let alone brands some kinds
of utility as different from others.
Adopting Becker’s view leads to the inescapable conclusion that
society should allow efﬁcient crimes (as well as efﬁcient torts)—
a result that at least in some cases economists ﬁnd to be distasteful
(Curry and Doyle 2016; Dharmapala and Garoupa 2004). Adopting
Stigler’s view leads to an uncomfortable realization that society’s
“branding” of “illicit utility” is quite contingent. Some acts that society “branded . . . as illicit” and criminalized just a few short decades ago are now constitutionally protected fundamental rights
(e.g., same-sex relationships, interracial marriages). Likewise, some
acts that society brands as “illicit” and criminalizes today used to
be acceptable not long ago (e.g., marital rape; Bennice and Resick
2003; Hasday 2000). As the discussion in the previous section makes
clear, certain acts are crimes in some states but not in others. Does
the illicit utility differ from state to state?
The Becker-Stigler debate has not been resolved, but scholars have
found ways to advance the theory while avoiding the issue. Curry and
Doyle (2016) formalize Posner’s (1985) suggestion that criminal law
aims to induce putative criminals to achieve their objectives through
voluntary market exchanges—a notion that is easier to accept for
some crimes (property theft) than others (rape or battery). When
11

Some of the discussion in this section overlaps with Raskolnikov (forthcoming-a).
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market exchange is added to the choice of either committing a crime
or doing nothing, Curry and Doyle (2016) show, maximizing social
welfare becomes equivalent to minimizing the cost of crime. Because
the offender’s gain is not part of this cost, there is no need to decide
whether or not gains of some offenders should count. Curry and
Doyle’s (2016) analysis explains several features of criminal law, such
as the use of criminal history in sentencing and the necessity defense.
Raskolnikov (2014) avoids the same question by focusing on a
subset of socially undesirable acts in which the offender’s gain is always equal to the victim’s harm. These acts, ranging from price ﬁxing to market manipulation, securities churning, insider trading, and
many forms of fraud, are intentional, nonconsensual transfers of money;
they amount to quasi-theft. As already discussed, although the transfer
itself neither adds to nor detracts from social welfare, victims incur defensive costs to prevent these transfers, and offenders incur costs to
carry them out. These costs make all quasi-theft unambiguously inefﬁcient whether or not the social welfare function includes the offender’s gain. Therefore the economic analysis of quasi-theft does not hinge
on resolving the offender’s gain conundrum.
While some scholars deal with the “illicit gain” problem by narrowing the acts under consideration, others resolve the same issue by
considering both alternatives. Mungan (2019, 11) builds a case for rewarding individuals who abstain from engaging in criminal acts by
either including the utility of criminals in the social welfare function
or ignoring it. The results, it turns out, do not depend on the treatment
of the offender’s gains. Mungan (2014) follows the same strategy with
the same indifference result in his analysis of escalating sanctions.
Miceli and Bucci (2005, 77–78) also consider both alternatives in their
study of escalating penalties, but their result holds only if the offenders’ gains are excluded.
The preceding discussion of the meaning of crime suggests yet another, new take on the illicit gains problem. Only three out of seven
index crimes are violent personal crimes: murder, rape, and aggravated
assault. The fourth one—robbery—is a both a violent personal crime
and a transfer. The three remaining index crimes of burglary, larceny,
and motor vehicle theft are all transfers of property. Looking beyond
index crimes, a large share of white-collar offenses are transfers as
well, in many cases transfers of money. Some of these transfers ﬁt
Posner’s (1985) market bypass theory, others do not.12 Either way,
one’s moral objections to recognizing the private gain of a murderer
12
When the transfer is from the government, such as in the case of welfare fraud,
tax noncompliance, and the like, no comparable market transaction exists. As we
have seen, the two white-collar offenses just mentioned taken by themselves give rise
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or a rapist do not apply with equal force—and perhaps not at all—to
recognizing the private gain of a thief, a tax cheat, or a corporate insider trading on private information.13 Setting violent personal crimes
aside takes much of the sting out of Stigler’s critique of Becker’s (as
well as Bentham’s and Beccaria’s) decision to include the offender’s
gain in the social welfare analysis of crime.
As we have seen, nonviolent crimes and white-collar offenses likely
give rise to major social costs. If so, another solution to the offender’s
gain conundrum would be to limit the optimal deterrence theory either to offenses involving money and property transfers or possibly
to a broader category in which the offender’s gains are purely ﬁnancial.
This approach is particularly appealing because violent personal
crimes involve severe measurement problems. Whether or not a murderer’s or rapist’s gain is illicit, it is difﬁcult to price it. The same is
surely true of the losses of the respective victims.14 It is also extremely
difﬁcult to value offenders’ gains and victims’ losses resulting from
crimes driven by animus (Hayashi 2019). Thus, instead of relying on
a highly questionable concept of illicit gain, the optimal deterrence
theory may conclude that violent and animus-driven personal crimes
involve gains and losses that are so difﬁcult to calculate that the theory
is not well suited to the analysis of these offenses.
Finally, one can avoid the illicit gain problem by switching from a
normative to a positive approach. If theoretical efforts focus on how
society can deter exogenously deﬁned offenses without asking what
offenses should be deterred, that is, if the theory focuses on compliance rather than deterrence, the illicit gain problem would disappear
altogether (Raskolnikov, forthcoming-a).
3.2. The Missing Explanation of Criminal Intent
The two most important features separating criminal from civil violations as a matter of law are the burden of proof and the offender’s
mental state, frequently referred to as intent.15 Economic analysis of
legal errors and evidentiary thresholds is considerable (Spier 2007;

to private costs (treating the government—or, rather, taxpayers as a whole—as a private party) that may run in multiple hundreds of billions of dollars a year.
13
Not everyone agrees. Cowell (1990, 136), for example, suggested that tax evaders’ gain should not be fully included in the social welfare function, for which he
was criticized (appropriately) by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002, 1447).
14
Needless to say, there have been many efforts to estimate the victim’s losses in
these examples, though not the offender’s gains.
15
As Finkelstein (2000) points out, the mental state speciﬁed in many criminal offense deﬁnitions is knowledge rather than intent.
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Zeiler and Puccetti 2018). In contrast, economic analysis of mental
states is almost nonexistent.
This omission is problematic. The offender’s mental state often
distinguishes crimes from noncriminal offenses (Finkelstein 2000).
Even when it does not, a speciﬁc mental state is a necessary prerequisite for a criminal conviction.16 From the mens rea requirement in
general criminal law to tests based on knowledge, purpose, willfulness, and scienter in environmental regulation, securities regulation,
corporate governance, and taxation, the offender’s mental state determines not only the existence of liability but the severity of sanctions as well (Raskolnikov 2016). Yet “economic analysis of law has
expressed puzzlement at the intent rules in the law. . . . Under the
standard economic approach, which focused on internalization of external costs, the actor’s intent would appear to be irrelevant” (Hylton
2010, 1242). It is revealing that Polinsky and Shavell’s (2007) comprehensive review of the optimal deterrence theory makes no mention of the offender’s mental state despite discussing such subjects as
social norms and fairness.
Deterrence theorists have offered several explanations of the role
of the offender’s state of mind, all limited to certain doctrinal areas
and all lacking rigorous empirical support. Posner (1985) suggests that
the intent requirement in criminal law is a proxy for the probability
of apprehension and conviction, a proxy for the offender’s responsiveness to punishment, or a means of identifying what he calls pure
coercive transfers. Shavell (1985) links the same requirement to the
probability of harm and the likelihood of escaping from sanctions.
Parker (1993) argues that the mens rea requirement in criminal law
relates to a putative offender’s cost of acquiring information about
the nature and consequences of his or her actions.
Raskolnikov (2014) identiﬁes cases in which the intent requirement has a direct and obvious connection both to efﬁciency and legality (as well as, often, criminality). He points out that inefﬁcient and
illegal acts ranging from insider trading to naked price ﬁxing, securities churning, embezzlement, and others all have efﬁcient and legal
counterparts that differ from their illegal “twins” only in the actor’s
mental state. If companies in the same industry raise prices because
raw materials have become more expensive, the act is both efﬁcient
and legal. If the same companies raise prices collusively, the act is
both inefﬁcient and illegal. If someone takes $20 out of my wallet
without my knowledge while thinking that I owe him $20, there
16
The point here is that even when the only factor that distinguishes criminal and
civil violations is the burden of proof, both the civil and the criminal violations require a particular mental state, usually knowledge or some form of intent.
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are no negative consequences in terms of either efﬁciency or legality.
If someone does the same while thinking that the money is mine, the
act is both inefﬁcient and criminal. The role of the offender’s mental
state in identifying and deterring all these inefﬁcient and illegal forms
of quasi-theft is obvious and intuitive.
Raskolnikov (2014) offers many examples of quasi-theft, and the
earlier discussion of white-collar offenses suggests many others. Recall the costliest white-collar offenses: occupational fraud consisting
of asset misappropriation, corruption, and ﬁnancial statement fraud
(Association of Certiﬁed Fraud Examiners 2018) as well as tax noncompliance, health insurance fraud, and retail fraud. Almost all of
these are money transfers and quasi-thefts. For all of them, the agent’s
intent separates a benign (and efﬁcient) action from a harmful (and inefﬁcient) one. So Raskolnikov’s (2014) explanation for the role of mental state applies to a signiﬁcant portion of acts studied in the criminal
deterrence literature, at least in terms of their economic signiﬁcance.
Still, not all crimes—however deﬁned—are transfers. Deterrence
theorists are yet to offer a general explanation of why the offender’s
state of mind matters in criminal law.
3.3. The Role of Offense History
Langan and Levin (2002) report that out of nearly 300,000 individuals
released from prison in 1994, more than two thirds were rearrested
and over half were back in prison within 3 years of release. Approximately half of all crimes committed in the United Kingdom were
committed by individuals with criminal records (Wickramasekera
et al. 2015). Repeat offending is a major social problem. And its punishment is a challenge for the optimal deterrence theory.
US Sentencing Guidelines escalate penalties for repeat offenders
(US Sentencing Commission 2018, chaps. 4–5). State three-strike laws
do the same (Durlauf and Nagin 2011; Shepherd 2002a). Prior misdemeanor convictions—or mere charges—increase the likelihood of a
later charge, arrest, and conviction (Kohler-Hausmann 2018, 74–84).
Higher sanctions for repeat offenders are a major feature of criminal
law. They are also common in civil law statutes ranging from environmental law, to occupational health and safety law, to immigration law
(Dana 2001; Polinsky and Shavell 1998).
The dependence of sanctions on the offense history has puzzled
economists for some time. “At the very best the literature . . . has
shown that under rather special circumstances escalating penalty
schemes may be optimal” (Emons 2003, 254). Although this is hardly
a ringing endorsement, researchers have offered multiple explanations
for higher sanctions for repeat offenders.
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In an early attempt to tackle the issue, Polinsky and Shavell (1998)
suggested that escalating sanctions may feature in an optimal deterrence regime, though their model supports sanctions below what
would have been optimal otherwise in the second period for nonrepeat offenders rather than higher sanctions for recidivists. Among
recent efforts, Miceli and Bucci (2005) show that if criminals’ opportunities to earn income in the labor market decline as they commit
more crimes, sanctions should be higher for repeat offenders under
some restrictive assumptions. Emons (2007) concludes that if the criminal market has a barrier to exit (think of joining a gang or knowingly installing faulty pollution control equipment), escalating sanctions are efﬁcient if the gain from the offense is high in relation to
agent’s wealth and several other assumptions apply. Mungan (2014)
offers a behavioral justiﬁcation for escalating penalties based on the
assumption that potential offenders are “weak-willed . . . [meaning
that they] ordinarily possess self-control, but . . . may lapse into committing crime” (Mungan 2014, 190). These individuals may rationally
abstain from committing a proﬁtable offense to avoid a higher penalty
for a future offense that they may commit in their weak-willed state.
Müller and Schmitz (2015) also emphasize the indirect effect of the
sanction for the second offense on the deterrence of the ﬁrst offense.
If ﬁrst-time offenders can only be sanctioned signiﬁcantly below the
socially optimal level, Müller and Schmitz (2015) show that escalating penalties may be optimal. Curry and Doyle (2016) demonstrate
that escalating sanctions are optimal if offenders have a market alternative to achieving their criminal objectives and if criminal history
reveals that the offender cannot be cheaply deterred. Endres and Rundshagen (2016) conclude that if the authorities minimize the sum of
harm from crimes and enforcement costs, escalating sanctions are optimal given a particular distribution of criminal beneﬁts among offenders with different offense histories. Buehler and Eschenbaum (2020)
use a model of dynamic price discrimination to reveal the optimality
of escalating penalties if the social planner chooses how to discount
the utility of offenders and cannot commit to future transfers.
Mungan (2014) sorts explanations of escalating sanctions for repeat offenders into three categories: those relying on (1) the stigmatization effect of the ﬁrst penalty, (2) the variation in the offenders’
propensities to commit crime, and (3) the offender’s learning how to
escape punishment (Mungan 2014, 190–91, citing sources). Buehler
and Eschenbaum (2020) add error-prone law enforcement as the fourth
explanation.
Dana (2001) takes on all these arguments with a simple, powerful,
and meticulously supported counter: the probability of detection is
higher for repeat offenders in state and federal, civil and criminal
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law enforcement (Dana 2001, 753–54). So it is not enough to explain—
as the models just described do—why expected penalties should be
higher for repeat offenders. One must establish that the increase in
these penalties on account of the higher probability of detection is
insufﬁcient, so nominal penalties should increase as well.
Dana (2001) himself suggests two reasons for such an increase.
First, informal sanctions that accompany the ﬁrst act of lawbreaking are likely to be higher than those for subsequent acts. So higher
formal sanctions for repeat offenders may be needed to counter the
decline in informal sanctions. Second, escalating nominal sanctions
may also serve an expressive function. Mungan (2010) adds another
reason: repeat offenders may be better at learning how to avoid detection than the government is at learning how to catch them. If
so, the overall probability of detection for repeat offenders may be
lower, not higher, than for ﬁrst-timers. Higher nominal sanctions are
needed to offset this decline. All these suggestions are more plausible
in some contexts than others. Overall then, despite many creative
and interesting models explaining the role of offense history in punishment, a general explanation of the pervasive offense-based penalty escalation is still missing. Perhaps, it simply does not exist.
3.4. The Mostly Missing Participation Margin
Deterrence theorists have recognized for decades that legal rules
may affect behavior along two margins. Because the initial analysis
used torts as a paradigmatic legal regime, these margins came to be
known as the level of care and the level of activity (Shavell 1980).
More general terms for the same two margins are compliance and
participation.
Economic analysis of joint optimization along these two margins
is surprisingly slim. Png (1986) shows that errors in determining compliance reduce participation in potentially welfare-enhancing activities
such as driving. Kaplow (2011) conﬁrms that imperfectly accurate
enforcement chills participation and studies the implications of this
insight for the optimal burden of proof. Friedman and Wickelgren
(2010) explain that the interplay between deterrence (compliance)
and chilling (participation) may make litigation settlements welfare
reducing.
When it comes to the economic analysis of criminal violations (as
opposed to harm-producing acts in general), the participation margin
has been ignored altogether. This is somewhat surprising. Posner’s
(1985) early economic explanation of criminal law is that it deters
offenders from bypassing the market, that is, prevents criminals from
taking by force or guile what they can obtain for a price. Obviously,
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market participation is an optional activity. The importance of the
participation margin in Posner’s setup is difﬁcult to miss.
Moreover, just as Shavell (1980) identiﬁed the need to consider
the activity levels of potential tortfeasors, Polinsky (1980) made
the same point about market participation by polluting ﬁrms. Pollution, of course, may lead to criminal liability (Scalia 1999). And ﬁrms
too concerned about this liability, including its mistaken imposition, may exit the polluting industry. The same is true of ﬁrms concerned about price-ﬁxing prosecutions and even of individuals chilled
by potential mistaken charges of theft, an example that Posner (1985,
1221) himself used. Clearly, the optimal deterrence theory acknowledged the importance of the participation decision early on, yet it never
developed models to investigate it in detail. Polinsky and Shavell’s
(2007, 425) literature review has a rather brief discussion of activity
levels. And and as they explain, the “determination of the optimal level
of activity presumes that individuals act optimally when engaging in
the activity.” That is, participation is investigated only conditionally
on optimal compliance.
Granted, lack of attention to the participation margin is hardly a
problem when one thinks about violent crime. Posner’s (1985) market bypass explanation has few adherents when it comes to murder,
rape, and assault. But the same explanation is much more plausible
in the context of property crimes and transfers more generally. So
the missing analysis of the participation margin in the optimal deterrence literature is a drawback.
Dari-Mattiacci and Raskolnikov (2020a) study agents engaged in a
joint optimization of the compliance and participation decisions. The
analysis yields a somewhat unexpected result: higher expected sanctions may undermine deterrence. Higher expected sanctions induce
some violators to start complying. However, these sanctions may also
induce some previously compliant agents to exit the regulatory regime altogether (or abstain from entering it). If the second effect dominates the ﬁrst, higher sanctions would lead not only to a reduction in
the number of violators but also to a decline in the number of compliers. If the latter effect dominates the former—and Dari-Mattiacci and
Raskolnikov (2020a) show that this is entirely possible—higher sanctions would increase the share of violators among those choosing to
participate in a regulatory regime. This outcome may be viewed as a
decrease in deterrence, and it may surely be regarded as undesirable
by law enforcers. The potentially counterproductive effect of higher
sanctions—especially when added to their greater cost—should give
pause to punishment enthusiasts regulating optional regulatory regimes. More broadly, the deterrence theory would clearly beneﬁt from
further study of the participation decision.
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3.5. All Sticks, No Carrots?
A combination of the terms “criminal” and “deterrence” hardly elicits associations with rewards, beneﬁts, and government inducements.
So entrenched is the view that deterrence is all sticks and no carrots
that sociologists and legal academics investigating a crime prevention
program that incorporates both view it as self-evident that carrots
matter for procedural justice but not for deterrence (Papachristos,
Meares, and Fagan 2007, 237). Criminal deterrence theory has paid little attention to carrots: “The effectiveness of positive incentives is an
understudied topic” (Durlauf and Nagin 2011, 40). But this appears to
be changing.
Polinsky (2015) demonstrates a clear beneﬁt of mixing sanctions
with rewards in criminal punishment. Reducing a prison term by allowing parole or probation for well-behaving prisoners, he explains,
may save enforcement costs without reducing deterrence. Good behavior in prison is costly to prisoners. If the government sets the reward at the level where the cost of good behavior to a prisoner is just
equal to the beneﬁt of a shorter prison term, the total disutility of the
sanction would remain unchanged but the enforcement costs of imprisonment would decline. Rewarding good behavior in prison is socially beneﬁcial.17
Mungan (2019) brings carrots into the criminal deterrence analysis
on a more general scale. He considers a seemingly implausible idea of
rewarding everyone who does not commit crime (during a given period,
presumably). Upon closer inspection, however, the idea of rewards (ﬁnancial or otherwise) is not that implausible. To take a stark example,
imagine that a marginal disutility of a prison term above 1 year is zero.
If so, prison sentences beyond 1 year have no additional deterrent effect
but give rise to enforcement costs of maintaining a large prison population. These costs may be saved without reducing deterrence by cutting
all prison terms to 1 year. Transferring some (or all) of the resulting cost
savings to nonoffenders would increase deterrence because of a wellknown insight that carrots and sticks are substitutes in their incentive
effects (Ben Shahar and Bradford 2012). Mungan’s (2019, 4) ﬁrst conclusion is that rewards “are optimal as long as the ratio between total imprisonment costs and the total costs of crime . . . is greater than the
imprisonment elasticity of crime.” His second conclusion is that if rewards may be targeted toward likely offenders—even if imprecisely—
rewards “can always be used to jointly reduce crime, sentences, and
17
The few papers that considered the same subject before Polinsky (2015) featured
signiﬁcantly more restrictive assumptions, narrower optimization problems, or both
(Garoupa 1996; Lewis 1979; Miceli 1994).
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taxes” (6). Programs such as the Chicago Gun Project described in
Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007) are very much in the spirit of
Mungan’s (2019) argument.
Dari-Mattiacci and Raskolnikov (2020b) also focus on carrots but of
a different kind. When regulators inspect potential noncompliers, a
ﬁnding of a violation punished by a sanction is obviously costly for
the violator. But a ﬁnding of no violations, Dari-Mattiacci and Raskolnikov (2020b) emphasize, is often more than just a neutral result.
Passing an inspection may lead to a designation as a low-risk regulated party, reducing future inspection costs and possibly even future
ﬁnes (Black and Baldwin 2012; Blundell, Gowrisankaran, and Langer,
2020). It may result in a regulatory stamp of approval for a practice, a
design, or a reporting position of previously questionable legality. As
a result, the future beneﬁts of that practice or position no longer need
to be discounted in light of legal uncertainty. And given the wellestablished practice of focusing enforcement on repeat violators (Dana
2001), a ﬁnding of nonviolation yields a clear beneﬁt of avoiding the
repeat violator status.
Highlighting all of these possible carrots resulting from successfully passing a regulatory inspection, Dari-Mattiacci and Raskolnikov
(2020b) demonstrate two stark results, one more surprising than the
other. The ﬁrst result is that the presence of carrots negates the standard conclusion that the certainty and severity of punishment are
substitutes. When carrots are in the picture, an increase in the nominal sanction is bad news for regulated parties. In contrast, an increase
in the probability of detection (be it an audit, an inspection, or a certiﬁcation) is a mixed blessing. This increase gives rise to both a higher
expected cost and a higher expected beneﬁt (because the possible carrot is more likely to materialize). Sanctions and detection probabilities are no longer interchangeable.
The second, particularly surprising, result is that when, in addition
to potentially obtaining the carrots just described, regulated parties
may choose to exit the regulatory regime or to abstain from entering
it, the certainty and severity of sanctions may have not just a different
effect on deterrence—they may have the opposite effect. The intuition is that if the nominal sanction is larger than the reward, the
net incentive is a sanction. Its higher likelihood has the same directional effect as its higher magnitude. But if the reward is larger than
the sanction, the net incentive is a reward. Its higher likelihood surely
does not have the same directional effect as a larger sanction. Recognizing the complex incentives created by the existence and changes in
rewards—especially when agents make compliance and participation
decisions simultaneously—raises questions for future research about
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some of the most fundamental conclusions of the optimal deterrence
theory.
It seems that enriching the model of deterrence by exploring different types of rewards is a promising direction for future research.
There is considerable empirical literature investigating the interaction
between crime and unemployment or wages (Chalﬁn and McCrary
2017). A number of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have studied
the effects of programs aiding reintegration of former prisoners on recidivism. Some of these studies found signiﬁcant impacts, others did
not (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017). Further theoretical analysis of the
interaction between rewards and deterrence may point toward new
policies and new directions of empirical research.
3.6. The Missing Welfare Analysis
Social welfare is at the center of the optimal deterrence theory.
Granted, the economic analysis of crime occasionally sets the welfaremaximization objective aside. The analyst simply presumes that certain acts “deﬁnitely are undesirable” because their “harm done exceeds
any legitimate private beneﬁts” (Kaplow 1992, 3). If one investigates the
most cost-effective way of achieving a particular level of deterrence,
ignoring social welfare makes sense. But in general, the clear objective
of the optimal deterrence theory is to identify the acts that should be
deterred, the socially optimal level of deterrence, and the least costly
combination of enforcement tools that achieves that level. The theory’s goal is to devise welfare-maximizing legal regimes.
Given the theoretical focus on welfare, one would think that the
literature would develop analytical frameworks that would connect
empirical ﬁndings to welfare evaluation. Yet with few recent exceptions discussed later (Abrams 2013; Chalﬁn and McCrary 2018; Yang
2017), this connection has gone missing.
Most of the empirical criminal deterrence research focuses on estimating elasticities. Chalﬁn and McCrary (2017) summarize and
discuss the literature. They conclude that elasticity of crime with respect to police (meaning the percentage increase in index crimes in
response to a 1% increase in the per capita number of police ofﬁcers)
is likely no greater than one and ranges from −0.2 for burglary to −0.7
for murder. The elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration (i.e.,
the percentage increase in index crimes in response to a 1% increase
in the number of incarcerated individuals) is likely to be smaller,
falling between −0.1 and −0.7, with “most recent estimates fall
[ing] in the low end of that range” (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017, 26).
The precision of these estimates is not high. “Consequently, we still
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know little about the elasticities that are central to a social welfare
evaluation” (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2018, 168).
Estimating elasticities, however, is only the ﬁrst step in a welfarist analysis. As Levitt (1997, 285) pointed out, “even if the impact of
police on crime was known with certainty, the social costs of crime
are not.” The social value of police, he noted, is not limited to reducing index crimes. Police also reduce crimes and other offenses that
are not included in the FBI crime index. Moreover, police engage in
socially valuable non-crime-related activities such as emergency medical responses. At the same time, police occasionally infringe on civil
liberties and abuse their authority, imposing disproportionate costs
on the poor and racial minorities. And, of course, extra police must be
ﬁnanced with extra tax dollars. Raising taxes gives rise to deadweight
loss and administrative and compliance costs.
In the end, Levitt’s (1997, 270) “highly speculative cost-beneﬁt
analysis” concludes that even given very large elasticities that he
identiﬁes, the “null hypothesis that the marginal social beneﬁt of reduced crime equals the costs of hiring additional police cannot be rejected.” Marvell and Moody (1996, 633) conclude that “cost-beneﬁt
calculations are not possible because one must include much more
than police costs, and at present there is no basis for determining just
what those other costs are.” Helland and Tabarrok (2007) are likewise
noncommittal.
Similar questions bedevil the cost-beneﬁt analysis of imprisonment. The elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration is usually
estimated by focusing on index crimes.18 Yet many other crimes, including misdemeanors, lead to periods of incarceration. Nor are the
costs of imprisonment limited to the government’s expenditures on
the prison system. Imprisonment is obviously costly for the imprisoned as well as for their family members (GAO 2017, 25). Even without these complications, Donohue (2009, 320) ﬁnds it challenging to
arrive at a clear conclusion about the cost-efﬁciency of the current
level of incarceration, high as it is by comparison to the rest of the
world. Moreover, if one considers reducing prison sentences, asking
whether this reduction would increase crime is one of many possible
questions. One can also ask, for example, what would happen if we
reduce prison sentences and redeploy the saved resources toward additional police (Durlauf and Nagin 2011).
Although the last question may indeed be “provocative” (Chalﬁn
and McCrary 2017, 40), many more provocative questions surely exist. Would it increase welfare if we shorten prison sentences and
18
The work of Lee and McCrary (2017) is a notable exception. Their data include
all recorded felonies in Florida from 1989 to 2002 (Lee and McCrary 2017, 83).
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make unemployment insurance more generous? Or increase the main
US wage subsidy—the earned income tax credit for individuals without dependents? Or boost expenditures on childhood education for
disadvantaged children? These kinds of inquiries are scarce in the
criminal deterrence literature. Research by Donohue and Siegelman
(1998), Heckman and Masterov (2007), and Aos and his colleagues
(Cohen 2005, summarizing results) are rare exceptions that prove the
point. Welsh, Farrington, and Gowar (2015, 448) offer a review of 23
beneﬁt-cost analyses of various crime prevention programs while noting that “beneﬁt-cost analysis continues to be underused in study of
crime prevention.”
In some respects, the paucity of beneﬁt-cost analyses may not be a
major problem. Imagine, for example, that the elasticity of crime with
respect to imprisonment is close to zero. This is not a far-fetched hypothetical given Lee and McCrary’s (2017) recent ﬁndings. If an enforcement instrument, such as incarceration, is both costly and futile,
one does not need sophisticated modeling to conclude that the instrument should not be used.19 To take another example, consider a
policing strategy that changes the manner in which police are deployed without changing their total number. This, too, is by no means
pure speculation. Evidence suggests that hot-spot policing, problemoriented policing, and citywide police redeployments all reduce crime
(Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017, reviewing numerous studies). When deterrence beneﬁts can be achieved at no additional cost, the policy maker’s choice is rather simple.20 But in general, the apparent lack of models that would allow estimation of social welfare effects of various
enforcement measures as well as broader social policies is a signiﬁcant
missing piece.
Chalﬁn and McCrary (2018) tackle this issue head-on. They construct “a framework for deriving the optimal number of police” in a
few intuitive steps (168). First, they cost weight the standard police
elasticity of crime, reﬂecting the fact that both the elasticities and
the costs of different index crimes vary. Second, they scale this costweighted elasticity by the ratio of the expected cost of crime to the
cost of police. Finally, they use this scaled, cost-weighted elasticity,
which can be viewed as a beneﬁt-cost ratio, to calculate the “social
dollars saved from increasing spending on police by $1.00” (182).

19
And yet some programs continue to be funded despite growing evidence that the
programs lack any crime prevention beneﬁts (Cohen 2005, 91).
20
Even this seemingly clear case is not as clear as one might think. If the crime
reduction is accompanied by extra (or extra aggressive) policing of poor and nonwhite
neighborhoods, distributional issues (broadly understood) would immediately arise.
These issues are discussed later on.
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Their analysis accommodates “heterogeneity across persons, crowdout of private precautions by government investments in policing,
and externalities in private precaution” (168).
They conclude that medium-size and large US cities are underpoliced due in large part to a very high social cost of murder. This conclusion is subject to many of the limitations discussed earlier in this
section (though some of them, such as the socially valuable effects of
police on non-index crimes, would strengthen the conclusion). Even
so, the work of Chalﬁn and McCrary (2018) is the most advanced effort to execute the optimal deterrence analysis of actual law enforcement policies.
Several other scholars have recently adopted a different approach
to assessing the welfare impact of changes in speciﬁc components of
the criminal justice system. Rather than devising a sufﬁcient statistics model based on plausibly ascertainable elasticities, they work from
the ground up. Yang (2017) identiﬁes the likely costs and beneﬁts of
pretrial detention both for the society and the detainees. She then
marshals the best empirical estimates of these costs and beneﬁts
while acknowledging that her cost-beneﬁt analysis is only partial
and the estimates are speculative and imperfect. She concludes that
the net welfare cost of pretrial detention is approximately $55,385–
$101,223 for a marginal detainee, suggesting signiﬁcant welfare losses
from current US pretrial detention policies. Although beneﬁt-cost
analysis of crime control measures is not a new idea (Cohen 2005;
Welsh, Farrington, and Gowar 2015), the most credible source for Yang’s
(2017) study is a very recent investigation that produced ﬁrst-of-akind welfare estimates of the bail system in the United States (Dobbie,
Goldin, and Yang 2018). An earlier effort in the same spirit is the work of
Abrams and Rohlfs (2011).
Abrams (2013, 968) evaluates the welfare effects of imprisonment
reforms. He “breaks new ground” by offering cost-beneﬁt analysis
based on recent, causal estimates of various deterrence and incapacitation effects. He ﬁnds that a truly one-time release of the least dangerous prisoners is the most cost-effective reform. A reclassiﬁcation
of some crimes (mostly downgrading nonviolent offenses) also yields
beneﬁts in excess of costs. Abrams (2013, 969) believes that his work
reﬂects a new “era of a scientiﬁc approach to criminal justice policy.”
Although other contributions just discussed support this view, progress
has been slow thus far. Even the basic cost-beneﬁt analyses are rare, and
more advanced theoretical efforts are in their infancy.21
21
I use the term “basic” to refer to the idea of comparing costs and beneﬁts, not to
the task of executing this idea in the criminal deterrence context, which is by no
means basic.
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Overall, as this section’s discussion of the optimal deterrence theory
makes clear, there is room to expand some aspects of the theory and
to develop some important neglected areas. The next section turns to
empirical challenges.
4. ADDING TO EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The main empirical questions facing criminal deterrence scholars are
well-known and exhaustively covered in recent reviews (Chalﬁn and
McCrary 2017; Levitt and Miles 2007; Nagin 2013). The following discussion considers whether answers to some of these questions can be
clariﬁed by looking outside of the criminal deterrence literature. For
some questions, such outside perspective is indeed highly informative; for others, less so.
4.1. Getting Help from the Outside
The earlier discussion emphasized that the empirical analysis of crime
is mostly the study of index crimes. These are seven offenses of major
social importance but of limited range as objects of study. Yet are more
data truly unavailable? Are criminal deterrence scholars missing a
chance to consider offenses that could improve our understanding of
crime and punishment?
Consider tax enforcement. Its economic analysis ﬁnds little reﬂection in the criminal deterrence literature. But the substantive connection between the two research programs is tight indeed. First, the
entire theoretical analysis of tax compliance is, in legal terms, the
analysis of tax evasion. Although legally questionable tax positions
are pervasive, they are simply ignored. Tax compliance models are
models of tax fraud (Raskolnikov 2006, 610). And tax fraud is a crime
as a matter of law, or at least it may be.22 Second, all tax noncompliance, fraudulent and otherwise, ﬁts comfortably under the rubric of
white-collar offenses. And, third, the foundational economic model of
tax noncompliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972) is based on Becker
(1968).
In other words, compared with the criminal deterrence research,
the economic analysis of tax enforcement studies the same subjects
(i.e., people and organizations) while testing the same model by using
the same econometric techniques. Moreover, tax enforcement analysis takes advantage of both RCTs and very large data sets containing

22
Tax fraud may be a criminal or a civil offense. The main difference between the
two is the standard of proof (Saltzman and Book 2020, 12.06[5]).
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highly granular administrative data—the kind of data that the criminal deterrence empiricists can only dream of. Naturally, one would
expect that some of the results in the tax enforcement literature
would be quite informative in answering the questions posed by the
criminal deterrence researchers.
Much of what was just said about tax enforcement is true of environmental enforcement as well. Other than the IRS, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has data collection systems “that
are among the most advanced among federal law enforcement agencies, if not the most advanced” (Simpson and Yeager 2015, 60). Analysis of environmental enforcement relies on the familiar Becker (1968)
model and uses standard econometric techniques (Shimshack 2014).
Yet there are few connections between the empirical analysis of criminal deterrence and econometric studies of tax enforcement, environmental enforcement, or any other regulatory regime. The following discussion aims to highlight the likely beneﬁts of changing this
status quo.
In practical terms, empiricists working on criminal deterrence aim
to answer questions that policy makers and the public are asking.
Should we hire more police? Should we lock up criminals for longer
terms? But although policy makers and the public may ask these questions based on intuition, economists have better reasons. They have a
model of behavior, and their empirical research aims “to test whether
[the core predictions of that model] hold in the real world” (Chalﬁn
and McCrary 2017, 10). It is in answering this question that the literature on tax and environmental enforcement is particularly useful.

4.2. Does Deterrence Work?
Becker’s (1968) model is a model of deterrence. Its core prediction is
that expected sanctions deter future violations, and higher expected
sanctions deter more. Given that the sanction for index crimes is
imprisonment, the key empirical question is whether longer prison
sentences deter more crime.
This question has proved difﬁcult to answer. Although scholars
have pointed out a number of reasons for this difﬁculty, the main one
is clear: it is often challenging—if not impossible—to separate the deterrent effect of prison from its incapacitating effect (Chalﬁn and McCrary
2017; Levitt and Miles 2007). Crime-prison population elasticity studies
and the analysis of the effects of sentence enhancements are not particularly informative in answering the question. Conclusions regarding
the deterrent effect of capital punishment are mixed at best. The same
is true of the studies of individuals’ responsiveness to policy-induced
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discontinuities in the severity of sanctions (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017,
31–32). Overall, disentangling deterrence from incapacitation remains
the “ﬁrst-order issue” and an “open question” (Chalﬁn and McCrary
2017, 37).
For better or worse, exceedingly few tax offenders go to prison.23
Yet there is no doubt that variation in the expected cost of noncompliance affects taxpayer behavior. Without incapacitation as an alternative explanation, the conclusion in the tax enforcement scholarship is
clear: the deterrence hypothesis captures an important part of human
decision making.
Compliance rates are dramatically higher when the expected cost
of noncompliance is greater. For income subject to both withholding
and information reporting, tax underpayments are almost certain to
trigger a payment demand from the IRS and may lead to penalties as
well. So the compliance rate for this type of income is almost 100%.
If only information reporting constrains underpayments, the compliance rate drops slightly to 95%. But the same rate plummets to 45%
when no third-party veriﬁcation exists (IRS 2019, 14). This effect has
been observed at the micro-level as well. Individual taxpayers pay
their taxes fully on income subject to third-party reporting. But when
it comes to income that the government cannot verify, according to a
tax audit experiment in Denmark (Kleven et al. 2011), the same taxpayers are much more likely to underpay. Having asked a question
of whether taxpayers are “unwilling or unable to cheat,” the study’s
authors came away with a clear answer—taxpayers are willing indeed
(Kleven et al. 2011).
RCTs involving letters from tax authorities conﬁrm the effect of
expected sanctions. When a random group of taxpayers receives ofﬁcial letters informing them about the consequences of noncompliance by highlighting sanctions and audit risks, taxpayers ﬁle more returns (Meiselman 2018) and report more income (Kleven et al. 2011;
Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001). Notably, these ﬁndings
are not speciﬁc to the United States. When it comes to deterrence,
it turns out that people respond similarly all around the globe (Bérgolo
et al. 2019; Kleven et al. 2011).24
The results are similar in environmental enforcement (Shimshack
2014, summarizing studies). Monitoring and enforcement actions by
23
Although over 2 million adults were incarcerated in the United States in 2013,
just 927 people were imprisoned for federal tax evasion not related to illegal activities
(Slemrod 2019, 911).
24
The results reported by Bérgolo et al. (2019) do raise questions about the realism
of the deterrence model. Among the affected taxpayers who randomly received tax authority letters informing them about likely penalties or audits, taxpayers whose letters
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the EPA and state environmental authorities increased compliance
with the Clean Air Act regulations among monitored and sanctioned
ﬁrms in the steel industry, paper and pulp industry, and among coalﬁred power plants. Similar results came from studies of enforcement
of water quality regulation as well as compliance by oil and gas processors. Likewise, “rule changes increasing liability or penalties signiﬁcantly reduced hazardous waste violations and toxic releases in
the late 1980s and 1990s” (Shimshack 2014, 353, citing studies). Deterrence strategies were also successful in environmental regulation
in Canada, China, Denmark, Germany, India, Mexico, and Norway.
None of these results establish that higher expected penalties always lead to fewer violations. One of the main reasons why they may
not do so—offenders’ poor understanding of the magnitude of sanctions—is discussed later. Another reason is that some offenses are
unique, and offenders committing them may not respond to sanctions
as the model would suggest. Murder and the (non)responsiveness to
capital punishment are the starkest example (Chalﬁn and McCrary
2017, reviewing numerous studies). Human decision making is complicated, and it would be foolish to assume that a simple model perfectly describes every aspect of it. Rather, the conclusion bolstered
by the tax and environmental enforcement literature is that at the basic level, human beings do take expected punishment into account
among other considerations. So if particular individuals do not respond to a particular change in expected sanctions in a predicted manner, economists and policy makers should look for reasons why this
basic relationship does not hold in a given case rather than wonder
whether the basic relationship exists at all. Deterrence can work,
but this does not mean that it always works.
4.3. Does the Likelihood of Punishment Matter?
Another challenge in the empirical criminal deterrence research is to
determine how potential offenders respond to changes in the probability of detection. These changes are “operationalized as the study of
the sensitivity of crime to police” (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017, 5). Determining this sensitivity turns out to be a difﬁcult task. Some econometric strategies fail to produce convincing evidence that any relationship exists at all. And when this relationship is found, the elasticity
estimates are not large.

contained higher penalty and audit rates did not pay signiﬁcantly higher taxes—a result
contrary to Kleven et al. (2011).
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These mixed results raise a question: Do people fail to react to variations in the probability of punishment, as the deterrence model predicts, or do the speciﬁc policies studied by economists and criminologists fail to produce the expected results for some secondary reasons?
Again, tax and environmental enforcement research helps answer the
question.
It turns out that people do care about detection. The starkest examples of the responsiveness to the expected sanctions described in the
previous section are actually responses to variations in the likelihood
of detection. This is obviously true of the aggregate differences in
compliance rates for income that is and is not subject to third-party
reporting. Kleven et al. (2011) ﬁnd the same difference at the microlevel. Pomeranz (2015) ﬁnds that detection probability signiﬁcantly
affects compliance with value-added tax in Chile. And a number of effective deterrence-related messages in letters from the tax authorities
are about audits and the likelihood of detection (Bérgolo et al. 2019;
Kleven et al. 2011; Meiselman 2018; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001). Moreover, when the enforcement regime is discontinuous,
such as when the audit rate jumps at a particular income or revenue
threshold, taxpayers take notice and bunch just below the threshold
(Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez 2018). An effort to avoid audits is an
obvious explanation.
The literature on environmental enforcement comes to the same
conclusion. Among the studies mentioned in the previous section in
support of the deterrent effects of enforcement, a signiﬁcant portion
involved closer monitoring, threats of inspections, and actual inspections (Shimshack 2014, 352–53). In different countries, during different decades, and for different US statutes, these detection-related
enforcement measures improved compliance. The full picture, of course,
is complicated. For example, ﬁrms appear to react to more than just expected sanctions. “State inspections, federal inspections, state administrative sanctions, federal administrative sanctions, civil penalties,
and criminal penalties generate different deterrence effects on average” (Shimshack 2014, 355). Still, evidence that in principle people
pay attention to the probability of incurring the cost of noncompliance
is strong.
4.4. Do Offenders Practice Rational Substitution?
When rational agents inhabiting the world of economic modeling are
deterred from pursuing one illegal activity, they do not turn into
model citizens. Rather, they look for alternative possible violations
where the offenders would face lower expected punishment. These
alternative offenses may be subject to lower nominal sanctions or
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lower likelihood of detection. Finding these substitution effects (also
known in the criminal deterrence literature as displacement) empirically would conﬁrm the realism of the basic rational agent assumption underlying Becker’s (1968) model. Finding no such effect raises
questions about this assumption.
Criminal deterrence studies “typically conclude that displacement
is a minor phenomenon, ﬁnding either no evidence of displacement or
that it is small in magnitude” (Yang 2008, 1). When it comes to geographic displacement, “a majority of the literature ﬁnds no evidence
of displacement of crime to adjacent neighborhoods,” and some studies “have found that the opposite is true” (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017,
18). For example, beneﬁts of effective policing reduce crime near the
treated area (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017, 18). As for inter-crime displacement, studies ﬁnding effects raise further questions. Shepherd (2002a),
for example, ﬁnds that California’s three-strikes laws signiﬁcantly deterred burglaries while leading to an increase in larcenies, possibly due
to a displacement effect. But Shepherd (2002b) concludes that truth-insentencing laws reduced larcenies slightly while increasing burglaries
by 20%.25 Lott and Mustard (1997) and Levitt (1998) both ﬁnd evidence
of inter-crime displacement, though neither study aimed at evaluating its magnitude. Moreover, Levitt’s (1998) results reveal that property crimes are not substitutes for rape and robbery while Shepherd
(2002b) appears to ﬁnd the opposite, as do Lott and Mustard (1997).
Do these ﬁndings imply that the rational agent model fails to describe the decision making of actual offenders? Not if one looks outside of the four corners of criminal deterrence. Carrillo, Pomeranz,
and Singhal (2017) report what happened when the Ecuadorian tax authority notiﬁed some ﬁrms that the government possesses third-party
information showing that the ﬁrms underreported their income. Some
of the ﬁrms responded by reporting higher income on amended returns.
But the same amended returns also showed higher deductions, eliminating almost the entire additional tax liability resulting from the
income increase. Slemrod et al. (2017) and Asatryan and Peichl (2017)
ﬁnd similar effects. Yang (2008, 1) reports that increased enforcement
aimed at deterring one method of evading import duties reduced the
targeted evasion but “led to substantial displacement to an alternative
duty-avoidance method.” How substantial? “The hypothesis that the
25
The former result suggests substitution away from “strikeable” offenses that start
the two- or three-strike count (burglary being one of them) into nonstrikeable ones
(such as larceny). This behavior is fully consistent with rational decision making about
property crimes of burglary and larceny. Yet it is not clear why truth-in-sentencing laws
that, as Shepherd (2002b, 513) points out, should “cause some offenders to substitute
out of violent crimes and into property crimes” have dramatically different effects on
the same two property crimes.
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reform led to zero change in total duty avoidance cannot be rejected”
(Yang 2008, 1). Evans, Gilpatric, and Shimshack (2018) ﬁnd similar spillovers in environmental enforcement.
All this evidence suggests that violators do indeed look for alternative noncompliance opportunities when the existing ones dry up.
If researchers ﬁnd no such substitution when they study particular
forms of policing, it means simply that substitution does not always
take place. This conclusion is entirely unexceptional given the multitude and complexity of factors affecting the choices of potential violators and the great variation in the nature of offenses.
4.5. The Black Box of Perceptions
If the empirical analysis of tax and environmental enforcement bolsters the deterrence model, but the observed behavior of criminals
does not follow the model’s predictions, what causes this disconnect?
One obvious explanation is that people respond to the perceived expected sanctions rather than to the actual ones, and people’s perceptions do not mirror reality closely. This is, indeed, one of the main
ﬁndings of the perceptual deterrence scholarship (Apel 2013; Nagin
2013). “Most people are not particularly well-informed about criminal penalties” (Apel 2013, 73). However, researchers also ﬁnd that perceptions of punishment are closer to reality when the punishment is
more likely. Thus, the general public has relatively accurate perceptions of sanctions for drunk driving. Eighth and tenth graders have
roughly accurate perceptions of various school sanctions. And high
school seniors are fairly informed about the punishment for marijuana
possession while adults overall are less informed (Apel 2013, reviewing
multiple studies).
Tax enforcement research reinforces these ﬁndings. People misperceive expected costs of tax noncompliance, and there is some evidence that those who are more likely to underpay their taxes have a
better idea of the potential costs involved (Raskolnikov 2009, 702, citing studies). It also turns out that the method of delivering information matters. Taxpayers who received information during a personal
visit from a tax inspector responded to it more strongly than those
who received a phone call, which in turn was more effective than letter mailings or emails (Boning et al. 2018; Slemrod 2019, reporting unpublished results of Ortega and Scartascini). Given that the information delivered by all these methods was identical, it is likely that
taxpayers’ perceptions play at least some role in explaining the differential effectiveness.
A distinctive advantage of tax compliance studies is that they allow
researchers to examine the effects of learning. Learning is obviously
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important to our understanding of perceptual deterrence. It is easy to
explain why entirely rational individuals would have a poor understanding of criminal sanctions. Quite simply, this is information that
most people do not need to know. They are not planning to commit
crimes, so they do not bother learning about punishment (Apel 2013).
But if people are rational, they should respond to information that they
do learn. Tax enforcement researchers have been getting glimpses of that
learning process. The picture that has emerged so far is complicated.
Some studies ﬁnd that audited taxpayers start paying more taxes
(Advani, Elming, and Shaw 2017; DeBacker et al. 2018). Others discover that subsequent tax payments increase only after audits that
uncovered noncompliance. Taxpayers found to be compliant during
an audit reduce subsequent payments (Gemmell and Ratto 2012).
The lesson is that learning about the expected cost of noncompliance
is not a simple, easily predictable process. More information about deterrence is not guaranteed to improve compliance.
Another lesson is that learning is nuanced. Press releases by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) revealing major
health and safety violations and related coverage in local newspapers
signiﬁcantly improved compliance of ﬁrms located close to the noncompliant site, but the effect declined with distance (Johnson 2020).
Similarly, peer facilities in the same industrial sector as the OSHAsanctioned ﬁrm responded strongly to the press releases while ﬁrms
in other sectors did not respond at all.
To make matters more complicated, tax enforcement research
reveals that whatever reactions taxpayers have to new information,
those reactions tend to be short-lived. Audits were found to increase
tax payments by taxpayers earning easily concealed income, but the effect disappeared within a few years (Advani, Elming, and Shaw 2017;
DeBacker et al. 2018). The compliance-enhancing effects of letters
from the tax authority did not last long either (Bérgolo et al. 2019).
These ﬁndings suggest that individuals’ misperceptions are not the only
challenge faced by law enforcement agencies. Beliefs about the particulars of the penal system may be not only incorrect but also resistant
to change. Recent experimental evidence supports these conjectures
(Zimmerman 2020). Given this complexity, criminal deterrence scholars investigating perceptual deterrence and other issues addressed in
this section would be wise to take advantage of the ﬁndings in related
literature discussed here.
5. THREE OPEN QUESTIONS
This review’s last major section takes on three open questions. The unifying theme here is a disappointing one: important as these questions
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are, the criminal deterrence literature addressing these questions is
lacking or entirely absent on both the theoretical and the empirical
sides.
5.1. Celerity: Missing in Action?
“The swifter and closer to the crime a punishment is, the juster and
more useful it will be,” said one of the founders of the deterrence theory centuries ago (Beccaria [1767] 1995, 48). Yet celerity (or swiftness)
of punishment does not appear in Becker’s (1968) model. In fact, that
model is static—it does not reﬂect time-related considerations of any
kind. So while the deterrence theory rested on the foundations of certainty, severity, and celerity at its inception (Chalﬁn and McCrary
2017), celerity has been largely missing from modern criminal deterrence research.
Beccaria’s argument about the importance of celerity rests on his
intuition that when the punishment follows the crime almost immediately, it leads to “the stronger and more lasting . . . association in the
human mind between” the two (Beccaria [1767] 1995, 49). Centuries
later, psychologists conﬁrmed this intuition in laboratory experiments
“using both rats and college students as research subjects” (Pratt and
Turanovic 2018, 192). The results of all these experiments “ended up
being rather similar: punishment is more effective when it is immediate, and even brief delays (10–20 seconds) can signiﬁcantly compromise
the effectiveness of the punishment” (Pratt and Turanovic 2018, 192,
citing multiple sources).
Perhaps potential offenders are capable of associating the beneﬁt
of crime with the cost of future punishment that comes more than
seconds later after all. Even if they can, scholars are skeptical. “Implementing celerity of punishment into the criminal justice system
in a meaningful way is a practical impossibility. The criminal justice
system is not built for speed” (Pratt and Turanovic 2018, 193).
But this conclusion seems overstated. It surely reﬂects the prosecution of major crimes (or just index crimes) in an idealized criminal
justice system. In the real world—and conditional on detection—punishment is swift indeed, especially for low-income suspects. They are
arrested and imprisoned upon detection, and they have no resources to
post bail, so their punishment could not be more immediate.26 In fact,

26
On January 1, 2020, the State of New York joined New Jersey and California in
implementing a bail reform that prohibits judges to set bail for misdemeanors and
nonviolent felonies. The reform is controversial, and whether the new rules survive
in their current form is in doubt (Asgarian 2020).
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for many low-level offenses, the process of arrest is itself stressful and
humiliating. One may or may not call it punishment because it does
not reﬂect a judicial verdict, but it surely is costly for the accused
(Feeley 1979). In contrast, prosecution for many white-collar offenses
does reﬂect the idealized picture of our justice system where no punishment takes place until the ﬁnal trial verdict and the exhaustion
of appeals.
Given that the celerity of punishment may be relevant as a practical matter—at least no less relevant than either its certainty or severity—what have the deterrence scholars learned about it? The only attempt to embed celerity into Becker’s model appears to be Nagin and
Pogarsky (2001). They add a simple discount factor to the basic deterrence formula, with the rate representing the individual’s discount
rate and the number of periods representing the extent to which the
punishment is delayed. They then empirically estimate both values
by giving undergraduate students a hypothetical scenario involving
drunk driving. What they discover foreshadows complexity in the
study of celerity: although some respondents prefer to delay punishment as rational agents would be expected to do, others prefer to accelerate it instead, possibly out of the desire to get it over with.
Interest in real-world effects of celerity grew after Judge Steven
Alm decided to experiment with the consequences of probation violations in Hawaii. Instead of harsh but unlikely sanctions, Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program introduced
light but immediate punishment ranging from a warning to a week
in jail. The initial evaluation of the HOPE program showed dramatic
effects. A randomly selected group of individuals assigned to the new
regime was 55% less likely to be arrested for a new crime and 72% less
likely to use drugs (Hawken and Kleiman 2009). Positive results from
similar programs came from Texas, Alaska, Kentucky, and Michigan
(Hawken 2016, summarizing studies). Kilmer et al. (2013) found similar effects studying a South Dakota program targeting alcohol-addicted
offenders. Chalﬁn and McCrary (2017, 40) concluded that “swift-andcertain sanctions regimes such as that motivated by HOPE . . . seem especially promising.” By 2018, 31 states were implementing the HOPE
model in 160 locations (Cullen et al. 2018).
But signiﬁcant doubts about the efﬁcacy of these programs emerged
before long. And some of these doubts relate to the role that celerity
plays in program outcomes. An RCT of HOPE-like programs implemented in four separate locations in Arkansas, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Texas with signiﬁcant involvement of the program’s architect (Judge Alm) and its principal analysts (Angela Hawken and Mark
Kleiman) showed no advantage of the HOPE regime over business
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as usual (Cullen et al. 2018; Lattimore et al. 2016). Another study of
a similar program that tested the effectiveness of swift-and-certain
sanctions in a different institutional setting also showed no beneﬁts
(O’Connell, Brent, and Visher 2016).
Hawken (2016) and Kleiman (2016) offered several explanations for
the absence of positive results in randomized controlled experiments,
as did Judge Alm (2016). These included a failure to replicate HOPE’s
“caring and therapeutic” nature (Alm 2016, 1202), the complexity and
multimodality of the HOPE intervention (Hawken 2016, 1234; Kleiman 2016, 1187–88), the failure to adjust the program to variable local
conditions (Hawken 2016, 1232), the choice of locations that already
had a successful probation regimes in place (Hawken 2016, 1232), and
lack of attention to perceptions of fairness (as opposed to the focus on
certainty and celerity, Hawken 2016, 1235), among others. These explanations suggest that uncovering the deterrence effect of celerity (if
any) in the real world is a very challenging task. Because earlier studies looking for the same effect mostly failed to ﬁnd it (Dušek 2015;
Pratt and Turanovic 2018, 189–90, reviewing studies), support for Beccaria’s intuition about the importance of celerity remains to be
discovered.
5.2. The Missing Misdemeanors
As the earlier discussion emphasized, misdemeanors are absent from
the cost-of-crime estimates. This omission is just one facet of the deterrence scholarship’s failure to address misdemeanor offenses. Over
the past decade, a burgeoning literature has highlighted the unique role
of misdemeanor enforcement in our criminal justice system (KohlerHausmann 2018; Mayson and Stevenson 2020; Natapoff 2018; Stevenson and Mayson 2018). But economists have barely joined the effort.
Both the theoretical and empirical sides of the criminal deterrence literature are missing when it comes to misdemeanors.
On the theory side, the optimal deterrence model is a poor ﬁt for
many misdemeanors. Granted, some misdemeanors such as simple
assault, battery, and burglary are just less harmful versions of related
felonies and may be studied using the same theoretical framework.
But many misdemeanor prosecutions are pretextual, and they result
in guilty pleas by innocent defendants in a mass processing system
that has little in common with adversarial adjudication (Natapoff
2019). In these cases, neither the private gain nor the external harm
arises from the (nonexistent) offense as the standard model assumes. Nor
can these cases be treated as erroneous convictions—something that the
basic model readily accommodates. Detailed studies of misdemeanor
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enforcement reveal that hauling disadvantaged youth and others (guilty
or not) through misdemeanor courts is a feature, not a bug (KohlerHausmann 2018). Even when external harms do exist, harms from misdemeanor prosecutions to the accused, their families, and their communities are of major importance as well. Yet these harms are absent from
the optimal deterrence model, at least for now.
On the empirical front, there appear to be no studies of the relationship between standard deterrence variables and enforcement outcomes for misdemeanor offenses. Sanctions for misdemeanors vary
a great deal from one jurisdiction to the next, and the same is true of
the detection probabilities (Mayson and Stevenson 2020). Yet whether
these variations affect behavior—and, if so, in what ways—remains to
be discovered.
This conclusion may appear stunningly wrong to a scholar of criminal deterrence. And in fact, in one particular context, misdemeanors
have been studied a great deal. That context is order-maintenance policing. This term is not clearly deﬁned in the literature, and the underlying approach has been also called by many other names such
as broken-windows policing, proactive policing, aggressive policing,
and so on. In spite of the different names, the empirical literature on
order-maintenance policing “seeks to understand if the intensity of
arrests for minor infractions has an effect on the incidence of more
serious crimes” (Chalﬁn and McCrary 2017, 19). Early efforts operationalized order-maintenance policing as the number of driving-underthe-inﬂuence and disorderly conduct arrests per police ofﬁcer (Sampson and Cohen 1988, and later Kubrin et al. 2010; MacDonald 2002
following the same strategy). More recent studies consider all misdemeanor arrests (Corman and Mocan 2005; Harcourt and Ludwig 2006;
Kelling and Sousa 2001; Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Rengifo 2007). The
effectiveness of order-maintenance policing, however measured, is
hotly contested and may well be very low. But what is important for
our purposes is that no study that I am aware of investigates the relationship between misdemeanor enforcement and misdemeanors themselves. Rather, all these studies attempt to discover whether misdemeanor enforcement reduces felonies (typically some or all index
crimes). These studies and the real-world policing strategies that they
evaluate treat misdemeanor enforcement as a means to achieve some
other, separate end. This is certainly not the approach taken in other
empirical studies of criminal deterrence.
In the past several years, legal scholars have demonstrated convincingly that misdemeanors are an important social problem that should
be the subject of a focused, rigorous study (Kohler-Hausmann 2018;
Mayson and Stevenson 2020; Natapoff 2018). So when it comes to
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misdemeanors, the criminal deterrence literature has some catching
up to do.
5.3. The Missing Analysis of Distribution
This review’s ﬁnal subject is missing from the criminal deterrence literature most decisively and, perhaps, most problematically. Although
the state’s regulation of crime (however deﬁned) surely has distributional effects, the criminal deterrence literature ignores these effects
almost completely.
Becker’s (1968) model of deterrence excludes distributional considerations. “If the goal is to minimize the social loss in income from offenses, and not to take vengeance or to inﬂict harm on offenders, then
ﬁnes should depend on the total harm done by offenders, and not directly on their income, race, sex, etc.” (Becker 1968, 195). The quoted
passage refers to ﬁnes, not imprisonment. Still, it is noteworthy that
at the time of Becker’s writing, the rate of incarceration in the United
States was 161 per 100,000; in 2007 that rate peaked at 767 per
100,000 (National Research Council 2014). One may have a different
view of what to include in the “social loss” from offenses given this
change. Yet Polinsky and Shavell’s (2007) comprehensive review of
the deterrence theory does not address distributional issues, despite
including a brief discussion of fairness considerations. None of the
recent empirical surveys, whether authored by economists or criminologists, talk about distribution. The failure to grapple with the distributional impacts of criminal law enforcement is one of the literature’s greatest failings.27
Many of the issues raised in this review may account for this unfortunate state of affairs. Empirical economists focus on index crimes.
Criminals committing them elicit little sympathy, so it may be easier
to miss their humanity and that of their families and communities.
Misdemeanors are ignored, except as a means of achieving separate
ends, as is the state machinery that leads to criminal sanctions for misdemeanor offenders (real or not) without any determination of their
guilt (Kohler-Hausmann 2018; Natapoff 2018). The knowledge of the
social costs of various offenses ranges from poor to nonexistent. Without knowing the costs, it is impossible to estimate their distribution.
In addition, pervasive legal and factual uncertainty is not in the model
27
Research on the relationship between inequality and crime does exist. That research, however, does not investigate the distributional effect of deterrence policies.
Rather, it focuses on the theoretical and empirical link between existing inequality
and crime (Burdett, Lagos, and Wright 2004; Doyle, Ahmed, and Horn 1999).
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because including it leads to indeterminate results (Baker and Raskolnikov 2017; Craswell and Calfee 1986). So the unequal ability of defendants of different wealth to take advantage of that uncertainty is
absent as well.28 And even though the racial disparity in criminal law
enforcement is staggering, long-standing, and widely known (Natapoff
2012, 134), race has found only a limited reﬂection in the criminal deterrence research.
There are ongoing debates about whether police target racial minorities in fatal shootings (Cesario and Johnson 2020; Johnson et al.
2019; Knox and Mummolo 2020; Schimmack and Carlsson 2020), vehicle searches, and pedestrian stops (Antonovics and Knight 2009;
Dharmapala and Ross 2004; Knowles, Persico, and Todd 2001; MacDonald and Fagan 2019; Pierson et al. 2020). Resolving these debates
is important but hardly sufﬁcient. Yet it appears that the literature
has not started to grapple with evaluating the criminal justice system
that even without racial targeting likely imposes a crushing burden
on the disadvantaged members of the society.
For example, the oft cited estimate is that 1 in 3 male black Americans born today will end up in jail. Although this estimate is speculative (Kessler 2015), even if the true probability is 1 in 6—and even
if it would be 1 in 10 if discriminatory policing ceased—it would still
be shockingly high and of monumental signiﬁcance for the distributional analysis of criminal law and law enforcement. Moreover, the
fact that we can only speculate about the magnitude of these numbers
is itself a failure of academic inquiry. It is also an another example, along
with the earlier discussion of the cost of crime, that establishing basic
facts about the operation of the US criminal justice system is of utmost
importance.
Another likely reason for the literature’s inattention to distributional issues is that an inﬂuential theoretical argument supports
this position. Distribution, this argument states, should be addressed
through the tax-and-transfer system alone. Legal rules, in contrast,
should be designed only to maximize efﬁciency (Kaplow and Shavell
1994). Criminal law ﬁts squarely under the rubric of “legal rules,”
freeing those persuaded by this efﬁciency-only argument from addressing distributive questions.29
28
More precisely, uncertainty is commonly reﬂected in deterrence models but only
as a binary error rate. Unfortunately, such binary representation fails to reﬂect the essential aspects of uncertainty as it exists in actual legal disputes (Baker and Raskolnikov 2017).
29
To be clear, this argument does not engage racial discrimination, racial proﬁling,
racism in general, and policy responses to any of these phenomena. The argument does,
however, engage all questions of distribution, including those that may arise due to interaction of racism and government policies (e.g., order-maintenance policing).
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Kaplow and Shavell’s (1994) claim has been long contested on various grounds. But the most recent objection may be both the simplest
and the clearest. Raskolnikov (forthcoming-b) shows that the essential assumption of the efﬁciency-only argument failed to hold for some
of the most consequential social and economic policies of the past several decades. During this time, US trade policy, competition policy,
labor policy, immigration policy, and social welfare policy, among
others, gave rise to large, unintended distributional burdens. These
burdens fell on low-skill, low-education, preretirement age workers
who were not well positioned to absorb or deﬂect them. Yet no offsetting distributional adjustments materialized.
Shavell (1981, 417) recognized early on that the force of the efﬁciencyonly argument depends on one’s “expectation that the income tax would
be (or could be) altered in response to changes in legal rules whenever
these changes result in a ‘sufﬁciently important’ shift in the distribution
of income.” In 4 decades since these words were published, many important distributional shifts have taken place, yet the tax-and-transfer
system has ignored these shifts again and again. Given this repeated
failure, Raskolnikov (forthcoming-b) argues, the logic of the efﬁciencyonly argument leads to a conclusion that is the exact opposite of the
one originally advanced. If the tax system fails to adequately reﬂect distributional considerations, the legal system should take them into account at least in some cases.
Even if one is not prepared to discard the efﬁciency argument as a
general matter, it is important to recognize the argument’s particular
weakness when it comes to the criminal justice system. Trade economists, industrial organization economists, and labor economists point
out that they did worry about the unintended distributional burdens
of US trade, competition, immigration, and labor policies decades ago.
Their analysis at the time led them to conclude that no signiﬁcant negative effects existed. Although these conclusions are being contested
or abandoned today, they were reached after a serious inquiry (Raskolnikov, forthcoming-b, reviewing the literature).
In stark contrast, there has been no serious effort at any point to analyze the distributional consequences of the dramatic shifts in the administration of criminal justice in the United States. It is no secret
that policing, prosecutions, trials, sentencing, and crime itself all disproportionately burden the poor and the minorities (Mayson and Stevenson 2020; Stuntz 2006). But the vast criminal deterrence literature
tells us next to nothing about the magnitude of these burdens, their
precise location, and their change over time. Without this information, we cannot begin to devise policies aimed at offsetting these burdens through the tax-and-transfer system or the legal system.
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Obviously, this review cannot remedy the long-standing inattention to distributional consequences of the sentencing reforms, ordermaintenance policing, cash bail, mass incarceration, and other criminal justice policies of the past decades. But if the criminal deterrence
research program were to pick one piece identiﬁed as missing in this
review for a major remedial effort, distributional analysis may well be
the one.
6. CONCLUSION
The conclusion that emerges from this review of the missing literature is that the missing parts are far from trivial. Moreover, some of
the omissions are more important than others. The following four appear to be particularly consequential.
First, the literature’s subﬁeld most visible outside of the academe
is the empirical one, and the focus of the empirical work is skewed
heavily toward street crime. This skew is not supported by data. There
is no evidence—and surely no consensus—that street crime is a much
greater social problem than white-collar offenses. We simply do not
know enough about the cost of both kinds of crime to draw conclusions
about their relative social importance. The literature’s disregard of
white-collar offenses without a basis for doing so creates an appearance
that here, as elsewhere, the haves get a pass and the have-nots get the
short end of the stick.
Second, the literature’s inattention to misdemeanors and misdemeanor enforcement is a missed opportunity to enrich the theory, expand the empirical results, and connect academic research to a vexing
social problem. More importantly, this inattention creates an impression that the literature does not regard a major part of the criminal justice system that affects many millions of mostly poor and nonwhite
Americans as a subject worthy of a serious study.
Third, the literature would beneﬁt a great deal from building on the
recent efforts to evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of an increasingly
broad range of crime-reducing policies. Importantly, there is no reason
to limit the beneﬁt-cost analysis to measures reﬂecting the variables
of the optimal deterrence model. Early childhood intervention, for example, is not in that model. Yet it may turn out to be the most costeffective way of reducing violent crime.
Finally, the impacts of both crime and the criminal justice system
vary so obviously, so starkly, and so disturbingly by income and race
that a research program that ignores these variations runs a risk of becoming detached from reality.
By disregarding white-collar offenses, by ignoring misdemeanors
and misdemeanor enforcement, by forgoing the beneﬁt-cost analysis
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of various crime-reducing strategies (especially those not reﬂected in
the optimal deterrence model), and by failing to address distributional
consequences of crime and criminal law enforcement, the criminal
deterrence literature may well be contributing to the overwhelming,
singular, and unjustiﬁed focus of American society and enforcement
apparatus on the forceful deterrence of street crime. At the same time,
the omissions highlighted here present a clear opportunity. Addressing them would enrich the literature, expand its appeal and policy relevance, and enable academics to contribute to the effort of setting
the US criminal justice system on the path of long-overdue structural
reforms.
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